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With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, sanctions 
termination has also become a ubiquitous phenomenon. Of the 292 sanc-
tions cases since 1990, around 85 per cent had been lifted as of 2018. Pur-
portedly unsuccessful sanctions – such as the European Union’s restrictive 
measures against Russia over Ukraine – often provoke intense political de-
bate about their potential removal.
 • Less than half of imposed sanctions end with some degree of target compli-
ance. For example, trade and financial restrictions imposed on Iran over its 
nuclear programme were lifted after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
significantly restricted the country’s levels of uranium enrichment. In contrast, 
the EU resumed development aid to Sudan even though the regime remained 
notorious for its human rights violations. Policymakers must thus regularly de-
cide whether to hold onto measures that do not lead to a policy change or to 
capitulate and lift them. 
 • These considerations are not only influenced by rational, cost–benefit analy-
ses. Instead, sanctions termination is a volatile and often inconclusive process 
shaped by multiple social interactions between senders and targets as well as 
their diverse logics of action. The removal of sanctions signals the end of the 
targeted regime’s visible international isolation. Such a symbolic act can be 
heavily contested, as controversies over the relaxation of United States sanc-
tions against Cuba exemplify. 
 • Decisions regarding the design of sanctions during their imposition phase af-
fect the eventual termination process. Some sanctions regimes contain revision 
provisions, expiry dates, and precise termination requirements, which ensures 
the regular assessment of the measures’ continued political usefulness. 
Policy Implications
It is much easier to impose sanctions than it is to end them. Unsuccessful sanc-
tions pose a policy dilemma. Lifting such measures despite their failure to achieve 
the stated goals may harm the sender’s reputation as committed sanctioners, but 
keeping trade or financial restrictions in place is also costly. A gradual easing of 
external pressure with the help of clear and feasible milestones can incentivise 
incremental change in target countries. 
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A Neglected Dilemma
Since the end of the Cold War, sanctions have become one of the most popular 
foreign policy instruments for addressing violent conflict, electoral misconduct, hu-
man rights abuses, and authoritarian rule. The measures employed have ranged 
from relatively targeted ones like asset freezes and travel bans to diplomatic or 
financial sanctions and commodity embargoes. Novel data collected by GIGA re-
searchers on the European Union, the United Nations, the United States, and on 
regional organisations (ROs) shows that these international actors have initiated 
more than 290 international sanctions targeting some 109 different countries (Attia 
and Grauvogel 2019). This data covers all sanctions imposed by these key interna-
tional senders between 1990 and 2015, as well as ones that were imposed prior to 
the end of the Cold War but continued to persist thereafter. 
The US initiated 150 cases, which makes it the world’s leading sanctions sender. In 
2003 alone, for example, the US imposed sanctions against more than 35 countries, 
many of which were unusual targets in the sense of being economically prosper-
ous democracies – with the measures imposed so as to coerce them into formally 
granting immunity to American citizens in front of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The EU (with 75 cases) and the UN (32 cases) make less frequent use of 
sanctions, not least because their decisions require more complicated coordination 
among respective member states. Sanctions senders not only differ in terms of the 
frequency of their sanctioning activity but also regarding the duration and geo-
graphic scope thereof (see Figure 1 above). While the US and UN impose sanctions 
with the highest average durations of eight and seven years respectively, measures 
implemented by the EU and by ROs are on average already removed after six and 
five years respectively – inter alia, because many of their coup-related sanctions are 
short-lived. Moreover, the US is relatively active in its “backyard,” Latin America, 
whereas UN sanctions – most of which are conflict-related – and EU sanctions – 
which oftentimes address governance issues – primarily target the African conti-
nent, as well as the Middle East and Asia to a certain extent. 
Figure 1 
Duration of Sanc-
tions according to the 
Sending State
Source: Authors’ own 
representation, based 
on data by Attia and 
Grauvogel (2019).
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The basic idea behind sanctions is to interrupt the ordinary diplomatic, trade, 
and financial relations between sanctions senders and their targets until the latter 
change their objectionable behaviour. The African Union, for example, terminated 
its diplomatic sanctions imposed on Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 after democratic elections 
were held in November 2010. Likewise, all nuclear-related sanctions imposed by 
the EU, UN, and US on Iran ended with the implementation of the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action, under the terms of which the regime in Tehran agreed to 
eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium and to allow regular inspec-
tions. However, only less than half of all sanctions cases are terminated because the 
targeted regime has made meaningful concessions. The US, for instance, has lifted 
various financial and travel restrictions against Cuba since 2014 even though the 
original goal of forcing the socialist republic to adopt a representative democracy 
has not been achieved. Similarly, European sanctions against Sudan ended without 
any significant behavioural change on the part of that country’s government. In 
2002 the EU resumed development aid to Khartoum, which had been suspended 
after Omar al-bashir’s coup in 1989 – even though the regime remained notorious 
for its human rights violations and infringement of political liberties. 
The termination of sanctions sends a signal that the formerly targeted regime 
will be reintegrated into the international community. Unsuccessful sanctions 
hence constitute a policy dilemma. Lifting them despite the failure to achieve stated 
goals is problematic. According to Cuban pro-democracy advocates, the removal of 
certain restrictions against the regime in Havana jeopardised human rights activ-
ism in the country (The Guardian 2016). However, the continuation of sanctions 
regardless of meagre chances of actual acquiescence also comes at a price. In the 
case of US sanctions against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989, US business associations lobbied against their continuation. Organisations 
such as the American Chamber of Commerce argued that the measures severely 
damaged US industries. 
While purportedly unsuccessful sanctions often spark intense political contro-
versy about whether they should be lifted, few sanctions regimes are imposed with 
a clear road map for their removal. The Western sanctions against Russia are a case 
in point: the attainment of the originally stated goal, the reversal of the annexation 
of Crimea, appears unlikely, but no alternative strategy for ending these sanctions 
exists thus far. To design feasible road maps for the termination of sanctions, more 
precise knowledge about how, when, and why sanctions end is crucial, but research 
has largely focused on the implementation and effectiveness of sanctions to date. 
Successful Sanctions End Quickly
Sanctions are more likely to succeed early on. If the targeted regimes do not ex-
pect that they can resist such external pressure, these governments tend to concede 
quickly because enduring sanctions would create unnecessary costs. Researchers 
have shown that governments even alter their objectionable behaviour at the mere 
threat of sanctions in such cases (Drezner 2003). Accordingly, some of the most 
successful sanctions end before they have even been implemented. Another ex-
ample of short-lived measures that result in some degree of desired political change 
are sanctions imposed by the AU in response to coup d’états. The AU unequivocally 
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condemns such unconstitutional changes of government and imposes sanctions – 
most notably, suspension of the respective country’s membership in the organisa-
tion – until constitutional order has been restored. These sanctions usually end 
quickly once political actors agree on a transition of power to civilian rule. Examples 
include the AU sanctions against Mauritania (2005–2007), Guinea (2008–2010), 
and Niger (2010–2011), none of which ultimately lasted for more than two years. 
The more pressure the targeted governments face, the harder it is for them 
to resist the senders’ demands. The target’s compliance, in turn, hinges on their 
political and economic vulnerability, as well as on their ability to mobilise counter-
measures. Many countries under sanctions engage in sanctions-busting activities, 
shielding them from potential costs (Early 2015). The aid provided by the Soviet 
Union and other countries of the Communist bloc to Cuba in support of the Castro 
regime during the first two decades of US sanctions prominently illustrates this. If 
sanctions fail to extract meaningful concessions prior to or quickly after their impo-
sition, two opposing developments tend to occur. 
On the one hand, senders hold on to sanctions for several reasons. Sanctions 
are measures “between words and war” (Wallensteen and Staibano 2015), which 
makes their continuation less expensive than the maintenance of other foreign pol-
icy tools such as humanitarian interventions. While governments have to mandate 
and budget for military missions, sanctions’ costs accrue more indirectly. Nonethe-
less, senders invest certain resources in the imposition of sanctions, which are lost 
if the measures are lifted as long as the goal is not achieved. These so-called sunk 
costs motivate sanctioners to keep their measures in place (Bonetti 1994). More-
over, leaders of sender states face high political costs when they capitulate and re-
move sanctions without obtaining meaningful concessions if the sanctions garnered 
strong domestic support. US sanctions against Cuba followed precisely this logic, as 
the continuation of those measures was largely driven by domestic calls for action 
(Schreiber 1973).
On the other hand, governments abandon sanctions when the costs of keeping 
them in place exceed the benefits of achieving the original goals behind them. A 
change of the ruling coalition often leads to a re-evaluation of long-lasting sanc-
tions’ costs and benefits, thus paving the way for their termination (Krustev and 
Morgan 2011). For instance, President Barack Obama lifted sanctions against 44 
countries during his first few months in office, in 2009. These sanctions had been 
in place for more than six years, and had been initially imposed by the George W. 
bush administration to target countries refusing to formally grant Americans im-
munity from the ICC. Moreover, sending nations experience “sanctions fatigue” (El-
liott and Hufbauer 1999: 407) when the domestic costs of maintaining sanctions 
attract increased attention over time while the willingness to compromise economic 
opportunities for political reasons wanes. 
The Signalling Dimension of Lifting Sanctions 
Yet sanctions termination can fail to occur even if it makes sense from a – predomi-
nately economic – cost–benefit perspective. Recently, the Donald Trump adminis-
tration reimposed restrictions on Iran and left the deal that had previously led to 
the termination of all nuclear- related sanctions even though the end of sanctions 
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potentially offered business opportunities, and the agreement was in the “best inter-
est of America’s security” as US Deputy Secretary of State Antony blinken stressed 
to Congress (blinken 2015). Three reasons account for the protracted nature of ter-
mination processes, which can follow different logics of action. 
First, the Iran example shows that sanctions termination not only offers the 
possibility to restore economic ties but also constitutes a visible symbol for end-
ing a target’s international isolation. Accordingly, President Trump did not see the 
removal of the Iran sanctions as a simple act of economic relief but also as a signal 
for the reintegration of a rogue state, which had to be prevented (Nephew 2018). 
The termination of sanctions signals rapprochement and a normalisation of bi- or 
multilateral relations (Grauvogel and Attia forthcoming). Such a symbolic act can 
be highly controversial, especially when sanctions end without target compliance.
Second, the termination of sanctions – especially long-lasting ones – is often 
a gradual, volatile, and even inconclusive process. With the increasingly common 
use of sanctions that target specific individuals and firms, the EU, UN, and US can 
remove people and companies from their so-called blacklists step-by-step. beyond 
responding to political developments in the target state, such a process develops 
its own internal dynamics. The EU, for example, gradually reduced the number of 
Zimbabwean officials and companies subject to travel bans and asset freezes over a 
period of no less than four years between 2010 and 2014. During this period, differ-
ent logics of action clashed: belgium pushed for the removal of diamond companies 
from the blacklist due to its own commercial interests, and the Netherlands was in 
favour of rewarding modest political reforms in Zimbabwe, while the United King-
dom insisted on keeping sanctions in place to condemn continuing human rights 
abuses under President Robert Mugabe (Grauvogel and Attia forthcoming).
Despite such struggles among member states, researchers describe the EU as a 
“responsive sanctioner” (Luengo-Cabrera und Portela 2015: 1) that gradually lifts 
measures to incentivise targets’ compliance. Our data shows that the EU does not 
stand alone in this regard: Gradual removal is a common strategy pursued by sanc-
tions senders in more than 43 per cent of the cases (see Figure 2 below). Examples 
include the termination of UN sanctions against Cote d’Ivoire and of US sanctions 
against Myanmar in 2016, where senders progressively lifted the measures in re-
sponse to on-the-ground developments. 
Figure 2 
Gradual Termination 
of International Sanc-
tions
Source: Authors’ own 
representation, based 
on data by Attia and 
Grauvogel (2019). 
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Third, sanctions termination is further complicated by the fact that not all senders 
impose and lift their restrictions at the same time. More than 50 of the 109 coun-
tries under sanction were targeted by multiple senders simultaneously. Yet, the dif-
ferent senders eventually lifted these sanctions in the same year in less than one-
third of the cases. Sanctions removal by one sender thus significantly diverges from 
ending all restrictions imposed against the target for a large number of sanctions 
regimes. This a-synchronicity severely affects the signalling dimension of remov-
ing sanctions. In the case of Zimbabwe, the EU and US lifted sanctions at different 
paces. EU concessions did not constitute a clear step towards sanctions termination 
in light of continued US sanctions, because people in Zimbabwe “tend[ed] to mix 
up” the two senders’ measures. [1] 
Missing Piece of the Puzzle: The Design of Sanctions
While pleas for better coordination among sanctions senders are numerous (see, 
for example, boucher and Clement 2016), there is another key piece to the puzzle 
of sanctions termination: their design, inscribed into the sanctions regime upon its 
initiation, crucially shapes the later termination process. Three key characteristics 
affect how, why, and with what consequences sanctions end. To begin with, the 
sanctioners’ policy objectives vary significantly in their degree of precision. They 
are laid down in the formal decision to impose sanctions – be it through an act 
of legislation, executive order, regulation, or via a summit communique. Ambigu-
ous goals undermine the signal necessary to convince the target to enact a policy 
change (Nephew 2018). Moreover, a failure to define objectives early on can result 
in the development of strikingly different visions of what the sanctions’ goals are 
among and between the different senders, thus making decisions on sanctions re-
lief more complicated. The Iran sanctions are a prominent example: while the EU 
slowly lifted its sanctions in response to the gradual advancement of the nuclear 
deal negotiations, the US, and in particular Republicans in Congress, viewed Iran-
ian concessions as insufficient for sanctions relief (Politico 2015).
Similarly, the incorporation of review provisions facilitates the enforcement and 
ultimately also the removal of sanctions. Review provisions require policy makers to 
regularly oversee the enforcement of the measures, and updates them on political 
developments in the target state. This makes dormant or forgotten sanctions less 
likely. The EU arms embargo against China, officially ongoing since 1989, serves 
as a warning example. This embargo has practically no effect on EU arms sales to 
China today (Hellquist 2012: 104). Nonetheless, the measures formally remain in 
place, not least because this sanctions regime contains no review provisions or sun-
set clauses that force policymakers to evaluate its political utility on a regular basis. 
Senders differ remarkably in the design of sanctions and their oversight (see 
Figure 3 below). The UN is the most disciplined sender, in the sense that the major-
ity of UN cases include both review provisions and clearly formulated requirements 
for sanctions relief. In contrast, US sanctions, which also have the highest average 
duration, only incorporate expiry dates in 5 per cent of their decisions, and review 
provisions in around 10 per cent of the cases. In addition, the language of the deci-
sions is the most ambiguous compared to other senders as more than one-third of 
US imposition documents do not stipulate clear objectives.
 
1 Author interview with a 
European diplomat,  
15 January 2014.
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Lastly, some senders invest in the institutional structure that embeds sanctions. 
This can affect the likelihood of termination in a threefold way. The creation of 
sanctions committees, task forces, or panels of experts sends a strong signal of com-
mitment, which can increase the chances of target state compliance early on. Such 
structures also allow for regular evaluation of the (un)intended effects of sanctions 
if the case continues. However, senders can also become more reluctant to remove 
unsuccessful sanctions if they have heavily invested in the institutional setup. Ac-
cording to our data, most institutional investment is found among multilateral 
senders such as the UN and ROs. bilateral senders – namely, the EU and US – 
rarely invest in specific committees and task forces to monitor imposed measures. 
Four Lessons for Feasible Exit Strategies
With the proliferation of sanctions, their termination has also become a common 
phenomenon. Sanctions senders are thus confronted with the key question of how 
they can terminate prior restrictions in a way that proves most useful for their origi-
nal objectives, or how they can avoid to lose their reputation as committed sanction-
ers if they lift measures despite them not having accomplished their original goals. 
Prior research and new data on the termination of sanctions suggests that four as-
pects are crucial for the arduous task of developing feasible exit strategies. First, the 
issue of sanctions termination must be considered from the onset. Senders should 
not impose measures without a road map for their eventual termination. Review 
provisions and sunset clauses ensure regular assessment of the measures’ political 
utility. Second, sanctioners should send a strong and transparent signal upon the 
imposition of sanctions as sanctions have higher chances to succeed at the early 
stages. This necessitates the articulation of clear – and ideally attainable – goals 
required for the eventual lifting of the imposed measures. Third, sender coordina-
tion is important for the removal of sanctions, not only for their implementation. If 
different actors such as the EU, UN, and US lift sanctions at notably different paces, 
Figure 3  
The Design and Over-
sight of International 
Sanctions
Source: Authors’ own 
representation, based 
on data by Attia and 
Grauvogel (2019). 
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this sends mixed signals to the regimes under sanction to which these governments 
can hardly react in a consistent way. Fourth and finally, timing is key. The gradual 
removal of sanctions can incentivise incremental change in the target state if that 
rolling back is tied to clear political benchmarks. 
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